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Abstract
How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and 
deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? 
By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will 
show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of 
financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, 
they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and 
vary in particular according to the different types of business–government 
relations banks were able to entertain with public decision makers. Still, 
“crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four 
case studies of the Irish, Danish, British, and French bank bailout, we show 
that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy makers 
and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while 
countries where banks negotiated collectively developed solutions with a 
greater burden-sharing from private institutions.
Keywords
financial crisis, banking, lobbying, United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Denmark
Introduction
Bank bailouts leave few people indifferent. Extraordinary amounts of public 
funding were made available to commercial banks during the financial crisis 
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of 2008, dwarfing the budgets of many other policy domains. According to 
some observers, this massive intervention was necessary to keep the bank-
ing sector from collapsing. According to others, it constituted an inaccept-
able gift to private institutions that will help to sustain unreasonable 
investment decisions in the future. In essence, the question is how much 
leeway governments had in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the 
height of intervention. Were the rescue package simply a response to the 
gravity of the crisis or did banks lobby policy makers for particular advan-
tages? It is possible that bank rescue packages were influenced by both moti-
vations. The risk of a contagion from failing banks created a public problem 
that justifies intervention, but it is difficult to know how much and what kind 
of emergency aid is necessary in a given situation.1 Designing bank rescue 
packages therefore resulted from consultation with the banks themselves. 
How much were they able to influence government policy in their favor dur-
ing these negotiations?
We propose to study this question by comparing national bank bailout 
plans across Europe and the United States in the aftermath of the crisis. The 
recent rescue schemes are particularly instructive, because a number of coun-
tries with comparable economies and financial sectors have opted for mark-
edly different bailout strategies (Laeven & Valencia, 2010; Schmitz, Weber, 
& Posch, 2009). Some countries, such as Ireland, poured more than twice 
their gross domestic product (GDP) onto the ailing banking sector, which 
eventually led to country into a sovereign debt crisis. Others, such as 
Denmark, spent surprisingly little, despite initially committing similar sums. 
Trying to explain both the magnitude of intervention and the difference 
between initial commitments and budgets actually spent, we concentrate on 
the period from 2008-2009 to get a grasp of economic policy making in times 
of crisis. After a short review of the costs of financial bailouts in most 
European countries and the United States, we select four exemplary cases—
Denmark, France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—to analyze the context, 
the specific arrangements, and the conditions of each national scheme.
Using the comparative data and the insights from the case studies, we 
argue that the magnitude and nature of state intervention cannot be explained 
by economic indicators alone. We show that there is no linear relationship 
between the extent of the crisis felt in each country and the public authorities’ 
reaction to it. However, the political influence of the banking sector is also 
insufficient to account for the costs of the bailouts. In some countries, banks 
lobbied successfully to shift the burden of banking sector losses on the tax-
payer; in others, banks were just as central to devising the policy solutions, 
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but ended up carrying a substantial part of the rescue package burden. 
Simplistic accounts of “crony capitalism” or banking sector influence cannot 
capture this variation. We therefore suggest that it is the political organization 
of the banking sector that matters. Countries where banks have strong inter-
bank ties and collective negotiation capacity have business–government rela-
tions that were much more apt to design a national bailout solution. By 
contrast, countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy mak-
ers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages. 
The nature of burden-sharing between public and private stakeholder, and 
eventually the costs of bank bailouts, thus result from the political structure 
of the banking sector, not simply its exposure to the crisis.
The comparison is based on data of bailout expenditures in Europe and the 
United States between 2008 and 2009, the analysis of policy documents, 
newspaper accounts and secondary literature, complemented by 20 inter-
views with administrators and banking sector representatives in France, the 
United Kingdom, and Brussels.2 The article is structured in three parts. A first 
section discusses the literature on bank bailouts and gives an overview of the 
most relevant hypotheses that will be tested. A second section presents the 
comparative data on commitment and expenditures and demonstrates that 
mono-causal explanations based on economic indicators or crony capitalism 
are insufficient to account for variation between countries. A third section 
therefore presents four case studies and highlights the importance of the 
structure of business–government relations for the design of the policy solu-
tion. The conclusion discusses the lessons of the case studies and the implica-
tions of the study for theoretical debates in political economy.
Understanding Policy Responses to Banking Crises
The comparative literature on financial turmoil has traditionally focused on 
the extent and origins of the crises, but also lays out the variation in policy 
responses. While some have studied banking crises across all countries over 
roughly a century (Honohan & Laeven, 2005; Klingebiel & Laeven, 2002; 
Laeven & Valencia, 2008, 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Rosas, 2009), oth-
ers have concentrated in particular on the recent crisis (Schmitz, Weber, & 
Posch, 2009; Weber & Schmitz, 2011). Although the focus of these studies 
may vary, it is possible to distinguish explanations based on economic and 
financial fundamentals and explanations based on the political and institu-
tional context in each country, in particular those focused on the role of busi-
ness–government relations.
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Economic Fundamentals and Financial Stability
Much of the policy literature on banking crisis analyzes bailouts by looking 
at the extent of the crisis affecting each country (e.g., Faeh et al., 2009). 
Indeed, we would expect bailouts to be more costly in countries where the 
banking sector was severely affected. In particular, as the size of the banking 
sector relative to the rest of the economy increases, the urgency for interven-
tion will become more intense (Laeven & Valencia, 2010). Similarly, the role 
of the banking sector for the financing of the real economy is likely to play a 
role. Where small and medium-sized companies depend on funding provided 
by domestic banks, we should see state intervention to prop up these financial 
institutions to keep their economies afloat.
According to such economic fundamentals, variation in policy responses 
might be a function of economic pressures, where the government has little 
choice but to intervene once the crisis has broken out. Inversely, lack of or 
little intervention will be the result of a small financial sector, where the col-
lapse of individual banks does not trigger the failure of other banks or send 
shockwaves through the real economy. Public responses are thus a function 
of problem pressure, which can be analyzed by looking at the structure of the 
country’s financial industry.
Institutional Explanations
If politicians do have some discretion when designing bailout schemes, we 
should see variation across countries according to political factors. Bailouts 
are a form of state intervention into the economy with important redistribu-
tive effects, and economists have repeatedly warned against the moral hazard 
they create and their welfare reducing effects. Rosas (2009, 2006) has labeled 
these two extremes “bagehot”3 and “bailout”: Governments either uphold 
market outcomes or intervene in support of failing financial institutions.
According to the literature in comparative political economy, we would 
expect countries with a liberal market tradition to refrain from extensive gov-
ernment aid, while more interventionist countries should be more proactive. 
Moreover, the varieties of capitalism literature have pointed out the impor-
tance of socioeconomic traditions for finding collective solutions (e.g., Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Siaroff, 1999). Countries with a corporatist tradition should 
be more likely to find collective solutions, while we would expect countries 
with a more pluralist tradition to rely on one-on-one relationships, if govern-
ments decide to intervene at all. However, the color of government might also 
make a difference. Traditionally, conservative parties are assumed to have 
closer ties with the banking sector and financial interests, while left 
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governments should be concerned about the redistributive effects of bank 
rescues (cf. Cioffi & Höpner, 2006).
Finally, the number of veto players in a policy process will increase the 
potential of blockage and might thus reduce the influence of one particular 
group—the banking sector—over policy outcomes. In such cases, we would 
expect the size of bailouts to be rather moderate. But others have argued that 
too many veto players may lead to gridlock and that in that case the only way 
out may prove to be pork barrel politics (McCubbins & Cox, 2001). According 
to that vision, then, at least small bailouts may be designed in a way favorable 
to certain sectors of the economy. At the very least, those sectors may suc-
cessfully water down strict conditions attached to bail out.
Business–Government Relations
While the list above reflects general political trends, it is also important to 
concentrate on financial industry lobbying in particular (Braun & Raddatz, 
2009; Keefer, 2002). In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, overly tight 
relationships between banking and politics were colloquially referred to as 
“crony capitalism.” In the 1990s, several authors had alerted the research 
community to the fact that a variety of forms of “meso-corporatism” were at 
work in various European Banking policy communities (Coleman, 1993a, 
1996a; Moran, 1991a).
First of all, the size and importance of individual banks would seem to 
matter, as governments can allow individual banks to fail if they do not rep-
resent an important part of the national banking sector. Moreover, a concen-
trated banking sector will have more lobbying resources and is more likely to 
have access to the government than a very fragmented one.
At a more systematic level, a political-economy literature has outlined that 
banking systems can be classified into bank-financed economies, where capi-
tal access depends on bank credit, and capital market systems (Rajan & 
Zingales, 2003; Zysman, 1983). In the first category, banks and entrepreneurs 
maintain club like personal relationships, with close connections to govern-
ments; in the second, banks are intermediaries in an “arms-length system” 
between the entrepreneur and the financier.
Whether one focuses on corruption, lobbying or banking systems, govern-
ment responses to financial crises are expected to differ according to the con-
nection between bankers and public officials: The tighter their relationship, 
the more likely are publicly financed bailouts. In the following, we will argue 
that the relationships between the banking sector and the government do mat-
ter for bailout arrangements. However, neither “crony capitalism” nor lobby-
ing per se captures this variation—In fact, financial lobbying is incredibly 
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well organized in all advanced economies. Rather, what matters is the politi-
cal organization of the banking sector that is key. Countries, where the bank-
ing sector has negotiated collectively, develop very different bailout schemes 
than the ones where the government interacted bilaterally with individual 
banks.
The Variety of Bank Bailouts
The financial crisis that started with the bursting of a housing market bubble 
in the United States in 2007 quickly gained financial markets and led to a 
series of bank failures, most notably Northern Rock in September 2007 and 
Bearn Stearns in March 2008, reaching a critical peak after the failure of 
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. By the end of 2008, the crisis had 
spread to Europe and Asia, affecting most severely countries such as Iceland, 
Ireland, Latvia, Spain, Greece, or Latvia, who went into recession or even 
risked bankruptcy. Between the summer of 2008 and spring 2009, the finan-
cial and the real estate sectors in many countries contracted significantly (see 
Figure 1).
To impede individual bank failures from turning into a general financial 
crisis, governments responded by issuing state guarantees to reassure deposi-
tors, providing liquidity support to banks, recapitalizing them and providing 
mechanisms to relief financial institutions of impaired or “toxic” assets. 
Some countries undertook all of these measures, others only some of them. 
Despite the different policy mixes, the height of expenditures engaged by the 
different national schemes was remarkable. In the United States, bailout costs 
passed the US$1 trillion mark in the summer of 2009, in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland expenditures reached US$718 billion and US$614 billion, respec-
tively. For a country like Ireland, such an amount represented 230% of its 
GDP. As was the case for Iceland, small countries thus suffered tremendously 
from the financial crisis, because the financial sector outlays were often much 
larger than the national economy.4
Even a quick glance at Figure 1 shows what is puzzling. There seems to be 
no clear relationship between the cumulated losses in the banking and real 
estate sector and the amounts governments committed to save their banks by 
July 2009, although governments tend to intervene when their sector is hit.5 
Other indicators, such as the relative performance of share indices of banks 
in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Weber & Schmitz, 2011), confirm that there is 
a negative relationship between health of the banking sector and the 
announced size of government intervention, as one should expect, but the 
relationship is insufficient to explain the degree of variation.
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To make matters complicated, money committed to bailing out banks was 
not always used. Figure 2 therefore considers the actual amounts that were 
effectively used by the summer of 2009. In most cases, governments commit-
ted much higher amounts for guarantees or recapitalization schemes, but 
those were not necessarily taken up. The United Kingdom or the Netherlands, 
for example, committed between 40% and 50% of their GDP, but only spent 
around 25%. Denmark is particularly striking as it committed 259% of its 
GDP, but actually only spent 0.5% in the 1st year of the crisis.6
Moreover, not all of the money spent is actually lost. Governments had 
the possibility to charge interest for the money they lent and levy fees for 
public guarantees. Assets they acquired (some toxic, others not) could be 
sold off after a certain period. In some cases, the write-downs on these 
assets were or are still going to be important, but not always. Without try-
ing to imply that the policy makers had all the relevant information to 
know whether their actions procured the government costs or equity, it is 
Figure 2. Actual expenditures versus net cost of bailouts by 2011.
Source: Bailout expenditures from European Commission (2009), Bank for International 
Settlements (Faeh et al., 2009); net costs from Eurostat (European Commission, 2009, 2011).
Note. Actual expenditures for all EU countries up to July 2009; net costs by the end of 2010.
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interesting to compare the amount of money different countries actually 
spent on bailouts and the net costs they appear to have borne by May 2011 
(cf. dark column in Figure 2).
Explaining the differences between actual bailout expenditures in 2009 
and net costs estimated in 2011 is beyond the scope of this article. It depends 
in great part on the value of the assets governments held, which varied 
according to a lot of different factors, both internal to the banks’ investment 
decisions, the evolution of financial markets and the design of the bailout 
(i.e., reimbursement conditions and costs of bailout participation). It is none-
theless instructive to see that bailouts cannot always be equated to throwing 
public money into the throats of greedy private institutions. The ways in 
which bailouts are designed and the costs they impose on the financial indus-
try thus need to be taken into account for a comprehensive discussion.
The question we will focus on in the following is as follows: What explains 
how much different countries decided to spend on bailing out their banking 
sector and why do we observe differences in the way these rescue packages 
were designed? Put more concretely, what distinguishes the countries like 
Ireland, the United Kingdom, or Germany, where bailout have been particu-
lar expensive, from France, Spain, or Denmark?
Explaining Variation
Analyzing these variations in a quantitative manner is difficult. The number 
of cases is small and the relevant explanatory variables highly aggregate. 
Explanatory variables such as the concentration of the banking sector are 
proxies that could give indications about the economic importance of the sec-
tor, but also the political organization or the potential influence of the sector’s 
lobby. More importantly, however, figures about costs and government inter-
vention are not always as reliable as one would wish for in a quantitative 
analysis. First of all, the statistical overviews prepared by organizations such 
as the European Commission or the International Monetary Fund are subject 
to extensive bargaining over categorization and accounting methods. Second, 
the numbers published continue to be updated or corrected. To cite just one 
anecdote, German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble discovered in the fall 
of 2011 that the bailout costs incurred by the German government were actu-
ally 55 billion euros less than previously announced! An accounting misinter-
pretation by the public unwinding company had overstated the liabilities of 
Hypo Real Estate in 2010 and 2011 (Wiesmann, 2011). While we may expect 
accounting errors of such staggering proportions to be rare, the event illus-
trates that one should be cautious not to overestimate the reliability of indi-
vidual figures.
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We nonetheless examined a series of indicators highlighted in the theoreti-
cal discussion and checked for correlations to help us focus our quantitative 
study. A correlations table can be found in the appendix. In line with the 
hypotheses developed in the section on economic and financial indicators, 
variation may depend on the relative importance of the banking sector in 
those different countries, as well as its internationalization. Figure 3 presents 
a common measure of internationalization of the banking sector, that is, the 
sum of external assets and liabilities over GDP of the banking sector and 
shows the great variety of situations that can be observed all over Europe.
Note. Internationalization indicates sum of assets and liabilities as a per-
centage of GDP (cf. Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007).As can be gleaned from 
the correlation table in the appendix, bank sector size and internationalization 
are strongly correlated. Yet, only bank sector size correlates with the actual 
costs or extent of bailout, while internationalization is related to the net costs 
of the fiscal packages. Countries that have highly internationalized banking 
sectors are also the ones that have intervened most heavily, with the notable 
exception of the United States.
Political and institutional factors have become very prominent within the 
varieties of capitalism research agenda. Using a measure of coordination 
developed by Hall and Gingerich (2009), one can see that coordination is 
strongly and significantly correlated with the size of the banking sector and 
also with the net costs of fiscal packages to stimulate the economy (cf. Table A1 
in the appendix). Unfortunately, this indicator is available for a few countries 
only. It is one of the single most important correlates of crisis management, 
Figure 3. Internationalization of the banking sector.
Source: Bank of International Settlements.
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but also the extent of the crisis. Other indicators, such as the partisan “color” 
of governments or the number of veto players, do not have any significant 
correlation with the extent of the crisis.
To sum up this brief initial overview, we find little systematic evidence in 
favor of either economic or political-institutional explanations of bailout. To 
be sure, bank sector size and internationalization have a measurable impact 
on the total cost of bailout. But we could find few other explanations to 
account for the great variety of reactions and the different the significantly 
different levels of financial effort to bail out the national financial sector. As 
shown above, this effort is not simply a function of the depth of the crisis. 
While the size of the banking sector accounts for some of this, a lot of vari-
ance remains unexplained. To push this analysis further, we therefore present 
four case studies based on these initial observations to better explore the 
mechanisms underlying aid decisions.
A Qualitative Comparison
As internationalization and the importance of the banking sector seem to mat-
ter for bailouts, we compare two small open economies, Denmark and 
Ireland, with two larger economies that nonetheless have an important bank-
ing industry. All four of these countries are thus likely to commit substantial 
sums to saving their financial sectors in times of crisis. Although all four did 
intervene by designing nation-wide rescue plans for the banking sectors, they 
differ in terms of money committed and in terms of the net costs incurred by 
the governments.
Denmark and Ireland responded very early on by making quite substantial 
sums available to the banking sector (259% and 232% of GDP, respectively). 
However, Denmark ended up spending only 0.5% of GDP. By contrast, 
Ireland spent almost all of the committed money (229.4%) and quickly slid 
from a banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis, requiring the government 
to request a bailout by the IMF and the European Central Bank.
The United Kingdom and France were able to stomach the banking res-
cues somewhat more easily than the smaller countries, but nonetheless com-
mitted 42% and 18% of GDP, respectively. The British lead becomes even 
stronger in terms of actual expenditures, which amounted to 26.8% for the 
United Kingdom and only 5.6% for France. By May 2011, the French bank 
plan had actually brought a benefit of €2.4 billion to the government budget, 
thanks to the interest rates and dividends paid for the support, but mainly also 
to the fact that no French bank ended up going bankrupt. The U.K. plan, by 
contrast, which entails the nationalization of two banks, led to considerable 
write offs.
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As Figure 2 indicates, Denmark and France are among the most profitable 
bailout scheme, ranked first and fourth in terms of GDP. In absolute terms, 
France leads the European countries. On the other end of the scale, Ireland 
holds the uncomfortable first place among all European Union countries, 
both in terms of absolute costs and as percentage of GDP. The United 
Kingdom follows in third position, just after Germany in absolute terms, and 
fourth in terms of GDP, with a loss of −0.9 percentage points of GDP 
(European Commission, 2011).
The four cases thus allow comparing two small open economies with 
two larger ones, which all had important banking sectors but vary along a 
lot of the dimensions discussed earlier. Most importantly, they also varied 
in outcomes, which Denmark and France among the most profitable bail-
outs and Ireland and the United Kingdom still struggling to deal with the 
consequences.
In the following section, we will try to demonstrate that the variation in 
government responses can be explained by the organization of the banking 
sector and their collective action capacity. Where banks maintained close but 
individualized relationships with the government, they were able to secure 
aid from the government that was tailored to the immediate needs of the ail-
ing banks, sometimes with considerable costs to the government when these 
banks ended up failing. Where the banking sector negotiated collectively, by 
contrast, governments were able to make them carry a more substantial part 
of the burden of public intervention. Moreover, banks monitored each others’ 
health and refused to engage in long-term assistance.
Negotiating Bailouts in Small Economies: Ireland and Denmark
Ireland and Denmark are small open economies who joined the EU in 1973, 
but only Ireland adopted the euro. While Denmark is traditionally described 
as a corporatist country and Ireland as a liberal economy, their banking sec-
tors started to look similar by the mid-1990s, after deregulation in Denmark. 
By the mid-2000s, the bond market on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange had 
become huge compared to the size of the Danish economy. Housing finance 
boomed, creating a considerable bubble on the Danish property market (see 
Mortensen & Seabrooke, 2008). Like in Ireland, the explosion of mortgage 
lending was fueled by the access banks had to cheap funding on international 
wholesale markets (Clarke & Hardiman, 2012; Lane, 2011).
When both housing markets started to experience a downturn in 2006 and 
2007, the exposure of both Irish and Danish banks to their own property mar-
kets became visible. Although much has been written about the housing mar-
kets in Ireland and Spain, the Danish drop in housing prices is even larger 
586 Comparative Political Studies 47(4)
than the other two (OECD, 2009, p. 18). At the same time, Irish and Danish 
banks experienced difficulties in raising money on international wholesale 
markets. Bank share prices dropped between mid-2007 and mid-2008 and 
Denmark saw it first bank failures in late 2007 with bank Trellerborg. By the 
summer of 2008, the government decided to organize the bailout of Roskilde 
Bank, to prevent a contagion to the rest of the industry. Meanwhile, the Irish 
government began considering nationalizing Anglo Irish Bank, which had 
invested roughly 75% of their loans in the property sector (Honohan, 2010).
On September 30, it became clear to the Irish government that Anglo Irish 
would not survive another day. Fearing a contagion, the government 
announced in a dramatic step that all deposits and most liabilities of Irish-
owned banks would be backed by a public guarantee. Danske bank, the owner 
of National Irish bank, which was not covered by the Irish guarantee, experi-
enced a massive withdrawal of Irish deposits. Five days later, the Danish 
government announced a similar blanket guarantee through the Danish 
Banking Scheme. In international comparison, both countries are outliers, 
not only because of the amounts guaranteed but also because the public sup-
port covered deposits and existing bank bond debt, and in the Irish case, even 
interbank deposits and new debt.
The Irish blanket guarantee, announced without consultation with other 
European countries, was severely criticized for its beggar-thy-neighbor 
aspects and for covering only Irish-owned banks operating in Ireland, a pro-
vision the government later revised (Honohan, 2009). Indeed, the solutions 
elaborated by the Irish government seem particularly erratic and uncoordi-
nated. For example, after the guarantee decision was taken, the chairs and 
CEOs of Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank met again with the Irish 
Taoiseach and Minister of Finance to find a way to save Anglo Irish. Although 
the solution elaborated was eventually not implemented, it is remarkable to 
note that nobody thought to involve Anglo Irish representatives in the discus-
sion (Honohan, 2010). Similarly, the hands-off approach of the financial 
regulator Patrick Neary in the run-up of the crisis has been criticized. Clarke 
and Hardiman (2012) note that “there was little evidence of the organiza-
tional and social distance normally required for effective regulatory enforce-
ment” (p. 33).
Trying to tackle not just liquidity, but also the solvency of their banks, the 
Irish government decided in late November to make public funds available 
and announced a recapitalization package of €10 billion on December 14, 
2008. Initially, the government proposed that the financing necessary for 
capitalization were to come from equity funds, including sovereign wealth 
funds from the Middle East, but Irish banks strongly opposed (Kluth & 
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Lynggaard, 2013). A privately funded solution was thus abandoned. The 
level of capital injections were negotiated individually with the banks on 
terms set unilaterally by the government. Under the plan, the government 
initially bought preference shares in Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank 
for €2 billion each and €1.5 billion in Anglo Irish Bank.
The recapitalization measures had little success in restoring market confi-
dence as their announcement was drowned by revelations of a circular loan 
scandal at Anglo Irish. The scandal led to a series of resignations in the man-
agement of Anglo Irish, the Financial Regulator, as well as Irish Life and 
Permanent and Irish Nationwide, which were found to have made deposits 
under the government guarantee scheme as exceptional support to Anglo 
Irish Bank. In the light of these revelations, the government announced the 
full nationalization of Anglo Irish on January 15, 2009. Shortly after, further 
capital injections increased the control of the Irish state in Allied Irish and 
Bank of Ireland, gave it full control over two building societies and made it 
the largest shareholder in all the major banks.7
By then, it had become clear that Ireland needed to find a way of dealing 
with insolvent banks and a more systematic way of assessing the value of 
remaining assets. On April 7, 2009, the government announced its intention 
to set up a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) by late 2009 for 
the transfer of toxic assets. NAMA currently covers all six Irish-owned 
banks, and acts as a bad bank: risky property assets are removed from the 
banks’ books through a special purpose vehicle, which is owned jointly by 
NAMA (at 49%) and private investors (51%).8 NAMA finances the pur-
chase of the troubled assets through government bonds and is run as an 
independent agency with management services provided through the 
National Treasury Management Agency.9 In addition, a Prudential Capital 
Assessment Review was set up in early 2010 to assess each bank’s recapi-
talization needs.
In 2010, the initial guarantees were up for renewal. In the light of continu-
ing deterioration of the situation of the Irish banking sector and soaring pub-
lic debt, a joint EU-IMF bailout was adopted in November 2010. The 
€85 billion package aimed to help restructure the remaining private backs 
and, eventually, sell off the nationalized banks. This took place in the midst 
of public outcry against the perceived loss of sovereignty.10 Yet, new stress 
test results published in March 2003 showed that the most battered banks’ 
situation had deteriorated, making another bailout necessary and potentially 
using up most of the IMF deal’s contingency. At the time of writing (March 
2012), new negotiations are taking place between the Irish government and 
central bank and the EU and the European Financial Security Fund on the 
other hand. Giving Irish banks—which are all nationalized—direct access to 
588 Comparative Political Studies 47(4)
the European fund would help “europeanizing” the Irish bailout and take 
pressure off the Irish central bank. It is not certain, however, that the other EU 
members that pay into this fund—all except Greece—will agree to this 
solution.
In the Danish case, events were no less dramatic, but the government had 
several policy instruments to fall back on during the outbreak of the crisis. To 
begin with, the memory of the financial crisis of the 1990s was still vivid in 
the Nordic countries in the 2000s, even if one can debate how much previous 
lessons were heeded (Mayes, 2009). Bank resolution was an important con-
cern and a public guarantee fund for depositors and investors (Garantifonden 
for Indskydere og Investorer [GII]) had been established in 1994 to provide 
guarantees for distressed financial institutions and help with their unwinding 
if need be. When the public deposit insurance was judged to be contrary to 
EU state aid rules, the Danish banking industry collectively established a 
private alternative in 2007, the Private Contingency Association for dis-
tressed banks (Det Private Beredskab).11
The Roskilde Bank failure was the first test for the Private Contingency 
Association, who took ownership of the bank jointly with the National 
bank. However, the size of Roskilde Bank, the seventh largest in Denmark, 
and its massive losses soon exhausted the Fund and clarified the crucial role 
for government backing and the Nationalbank leading role (Carstensen, 
2013). Still, the Private Contingency Association became the backbone of 
the Danish bailout plan, the government and the Danish Bankers Association 
(DBA) began to negotiate as confidence faltered in September 2008.
The Danish bailout scheme became known as “Bank Bailout Package I” 
and specified that all members of the Private Contingency Association were 
covered by an unlimited deposit guarantee until September 30, 2010. In 
return, the combined contribution of private banks to the Fund amounts to 35 
billion DKK (approximately €4.7 billion), which divided up into three parts: 
a collective guarantee scheme of 10 billion DK, payments to the government 
for the public backing of 15 billion DK and an additional 10 billion DK set 
aside in case the first pillar was insufficient. The government in turn commit-
ted to set aside the money paid by the Fund to cover potential bank losses 
stemming from bank failures and to guaranteed all deposits beyond the 
depositor insurance scheme in case the funds of the private scheme was 
exhausted. In particular, the government established the winding up company 
Financial Stability (Finansial Stabilitet A/S), which could secure the payment 
of creditor claims to distressed institutions and handle the controlled disman-
tling of financial institutions that no longer met solvency requirements. The 
Bank Bailout Package I was passed by the Danish parliament on October 10, 
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2008, following an agreement between the government, political parties, and 
the DBA 5 days earlier, and became effective on October 11.
Although the bailout scheme helped to avoid a run on Danish banks and 
prepare the orderly resolution of troubled institutions, funding difficulties 
continued throughout the remainder of 2008 and many feared the collapse of 
even the largest banks, including Danske Bank. To avoid a generalized crisis 
and credit squeeze, the Danish parliament adopted an additional legislation to 
address solvency difficulties through recapitalization, Bank Package II on 
February 3, 2009, for a total of potentially up to 100 billion DK (€14 billion). 
Moreover, Bank Package II introduced a guarantee scheme for loans until the 
end of 2013 (Østrup, 2010).
A third package was introduced in March 2010 to extend the previous 
deposit guarantee scheme set to expire at the end of September 2010 and 
bring Danish deposit insurance in line with EU legislation. Effective on 
October 1, 2010, Bank Package III entails a deposit guarantee of 750,000 DK 
per customer. The agreement also entails a standard set-up for dismantling 
distressed financial institutions and is financed through a contribution of 3.2 
billion DK from the banking industry to the public unwinding company 
Finansiel Stabilitet S/A. A fourth package became necessary in August 2011 
when the failure of two banks proved difficult to manage. Finally, a fifth 
package completed the Danish scheme in March 2012.
Through the contributions of the private sector, the public expenditures 
actually used in the Danish case were minimal, compared with the Irish case. 
In this context, it is important to note that the difference in costs of the bank 
bailout is not due to the general health of the banking sector. Only a small 
minority of Danish banks chose not to be covered by and contribute to the 
unlimited guarantee scheme. Concerning recapitalization, a total of 50 banks 
and mortgage lenders applied for capital contributions.12 With 9 bank fail-
ures, the Financial Stability Company continued to manage the resolution of 
6 banks through subsidiaries (i.e., bad banks) by 2012.
The collectively negotiated bailout packages in Denmark shifted the bur-
den of failing banks to the private sector. In Ireland, the government negoti-
ated with banks in individual consultations, both concerning the conditions 
they would accept for their own rescue, but also concerning possible public-
private bailouts of other Irish banks, as in the case of Anglo Irish. Irish banks 
only spoke up with one voice when they refused private foreign investors as 
part of the national recapitalization scheme. They did not, however, have the 
will or the capacity to organize to propose a comprehensive bailout scheme. 
In sum, although the type of exposure and the initial responses were very 
similar in Denmark and Ireland, the negotiations between the financial indus-
try and the government were remarkably different.
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Skeptics might argue that the lessons from these two cases should not be 
extended beyond small countries, where clientelistic relationships and collec-
tive problem solving are more common because the networks between eco-
nomic and political elites are so tight. The Danish public–private arrangement 
might furthermore be a typical story of Scandinavian corporatism. Extending 
the comparison to larger countries illustrates that the general pattern holds 
true there as well. Relationships between bank management and policy mak-
ers in the United Kingdom were not as clientelistic and wrought by scandals 
as in Ireland and the United Kingdom’s government managed to propose a 
much praised nation-wide bailout scheme, which inspired many other coun-
tries (Quaglia, 2009). However, the costs of the bailout remained on the 
shoulders of the government. In the French case, by contrast, a public–private 
solution was found. Like in Denmark, the French scheme depended on the 
high organizational capacity in France, which has a long tradition of inter-
banking ties.
To be sure, the British exposure to the crisis was more intense and started 
considerably earlier, with the nationalization of Northern Rock in February 
2008 after a run on the bank in September 2007. Despite effort to maintain 
liquidity, the situation deteriorated. The government enabled a takeover of 
HBOS by Lloyds TBS in September, but failed to find a similar solution for 
Bradford and Bingley, which was nationalized by the end of September 2008. 
Simultaneously, the U.K. government was drawn into the Icelandic financial 
crisis.13
To avoid a collapse of the entire banking system, the government devel-
oped a comprehensive bailout scheme in meeting between the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Treasury, and bank representatives on October 2, 2008. 
When coordination with the EU proved unsuccessful and U.K. stock markets 
continued to plummet, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Alistair Darling decided to announce a £500 billion bailout pack-
age on October 8. The initial British plan had three pillars: (a) recapitalization 
through a Bank Recapitalization Fund, for £50 billion; (b) a Credit Guarantee 
Scheme, a government loan guarantee for new debt issued between British 
banks for up to £250 billion; and (c) liquidity provision through short-term 
loans made available through a Special Liquidity Scheme operated by the 
Bank of England, for £200 billion.
The U.K. bank support plan was voluntary. Banks benefitting from the 
rescue package had to accept restrictions on executive pay, changes in corpo-
rate governance and dividends to existing shareholders. They furthermore 
committed to offer reasonable credit to homeowners and small businesses. 
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Although banks such as HSBC Group, Standard Chartered, or Barclays 
declared their support for the plan, they announced that they will not have 
recourse to the government recapitalization. Only the Royal Bank of Scotland 
and Lloyds TSB together with HBOS applied for government funding. 
Following a series of adjustments and transactions, the capital injections 
eventually led the British government to acquire 83% of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (but only 68% of the voting rights) and 41% of Lloyds (National 
Audit Office, 2010). Following the nationalizations of Northern Rock, 
Bradford and Bingley, and the solicitation of the Bank Recapitalization Plan, 
the government decided to establish United Kingdom Financial Investments 
in November 2008 as a vehicle for managing public ownership in the banking 
system.
In France, the crisis arrived only in 2008, in particular when it became 
clear that Natixis, the investment branch of Banque Populaire and Caisse 
d’Epargne, was heavily exposed to both the subprime crisis and the Madoff 
fraud. By the fall of 2008, the value of Natixis’ stock dropped by 95%, which 
led to the resignation of the CEOs of Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne 
in March 2009. In a deal brokered by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, 
the two banks merged (Massoc & Jabko, 2012). The Franco-Belgian public 
finance bank Dexia also came into trouble in September 2008 due to liquidity 
difficulties. Dexia was quickly forced to apply for state aid and was bailed 
out by uniquely coordinated action between the Belgian, the French, and the 
Luxembourg governments.
Parallel to these individual measures, the government developed a com-
prehensive bailout scheme together with the six main French banks. 
Announced on October 12, 2008, the French plan was put into place by 
law 4 days later. It consists of two ad hoc institutions: The Société de 
Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF), set up to raise capital on 
financial markets and provide liquidity to ailing financial institutions, and 
the Société de Prise de Pariticipation de l’Etat (SPPE), through which the 
government would buy equities from the French banks and thus help to 
recapitalize them. In the European landscape, the SFEF is a unique arrange-
ment as it is jointly owned by the six big banks and the governments, 
which hold 66% and 34%, respectively. Seven other financial institutions 
also signed the SFEF agreement to benefit from the liquidity provided 
through the state-backed mechanism (Cour des Comptes, 2009).14 
Interestingly, HSBC France did not sign the agreement, but was a share-
holder of the SFEF. The government agreed to guarantee bank bonds 
issued by the SFEF up to €360 billion for a maximum maturity of 5 years.15 
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At the same time, the SPPE would invest €10.5 billion in the recapitaliza-
tion of French banks by January 2009.
Because of the systemic risk they represented, the six main French banks 
were the beneficiaries of the SFEF and the SPPE. To avoid stigmatizing any 
one particular bank, all six agreed to be recapitalized simultaneously 
through the SPPE. Put differently, the government struck a deal with the six 
main institutions, which effectively constrained them to accept capital and 
increase domestic lending. In 2009, the government agreed to expand 
recapitalization through the SPPE to an additional €10.25 billion. Whereas 
all six banks had participated in the first tranche by issuing deeply subordi-
nated debt securities to the SPPE, the rational for participating in the sec-
ond tranche was less evident for banks that were not in obvious financial 
difficulties. Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mutuel therefore decided not to par-
ticipate in the second phase of SPPE intervention. The two ad hoc institu-
tions were created for a limited amount of time and ended their programs 
according to schedule.
In the British case, more than just additional funds were needed. As banks 
continued requiring government help, the costs imposed on the government 
continued to grow and the government developed new legislation to regulate 
banks further and be able to intervene in a preventive manner in the future. 
Through new rules established by the Banking Act in February 2009, the 
FSA and the Bank of England obtained powers to determine the viability of 
British financial institutions and to exercise stabilization measures, includ-
ing the sale of all or parts of the business to a private sector purchaser or a 
transfer to a “bridge bank” to organize the orderly dismantling. Moreover, 
the Treasury retains the right to take a bank into public ownership. The 
Banking Act 2009 thus granted considerable powers to force the resolution 
of a bank esteemed to pose a risk for national financial stability. But none of 
these changes and of the additional instruments agreed on in the course of 
2009 were able to alleviate the costs the massive bank failures imposed on 
the government. As a result, the most important consequence of the financial 
crisis in the United Kingdom was the reorganization of regulatory oversight. 
In particular, the role of the FSA was severely criticized for failing to inter-
vene early on and have ceded too much to self-confident bank management. 
A decade after Gordon Brown’s financial service market reform and the cre-
ation of the FSA, powers are currently moved back to the Bank of England 
and the Treasury has established itself as a key player in banking regulation 
(House of Commons, 2008). Although the United Kingdom is generally 
cited as a liberal market economy with little intervention, this is no longer 
true for banking.
 
Grossman and Woll 593
The British bailout plan is said to have inspired many policy makers 
abroad and even led to a change of the U.S. Troubled Asset Relief Plan 
(Quaglia, 2009). Similarly, the reform of banking regulation in 2009 was 
quite comprehensive and went further than in several other European coun-
tries. According to several commentators, the costs imposed on banks receiv-
ing government aid in the United Kingdom were also particularly constraining. 
It is thus fair to say that the British government bailout was a well-designed 
government policy and not a gift to the banking industry, as some might argue 
for the case of Ireland. The government nonetheless bore the costs of the fail-
ing institutions, which weighted heavily on the public budget. Despite 
attempts to broker private mergers for failing banks, the British bailout did 
not force the private sector to participate in preventing an overall collapse.
In France, the public–private partnership was possible because interbank-
ing ties were traditionally strong and easily activated. To be sure, some of the 
conditions of the bailout were favorable to the banking industry. The French 
Court of Audit, the Cour des Comptes, for example, argued that revenue 
might have been higher had the conditions granted to banks been somewhat 
more ambitious.16 Moreover, all government revenue consists of interest pay-
ments and dividends, while the government had not demanded a share of the 
capital gain of the supported banks (Zimmer et al., 2011). The Court of Audit 
also criticized the second tranche of SPPE financing, arguing that it might not 
have been necessary, as banks could have raised capital on financial markets 
(Cour des Comptes, 2010). Still, the SFEF arrangement was generally 
esteemed to have worked well, because its centralized issuance of state-
backed bonds allowed the SFEF to provide an important volume and offer a 
very low price for their bonds.17 The collective action capacity of the French 
banking industry is thus responsible for the upsides and the downsides of the 
bailout. Massoc and Jabko (2012) have criticized the workings of the “infor-
mal consortium,” which steered the French financial industry through the 
tumultuous period. But the downsides do not weight heavily when a bailout 
actually provides new revenue to the government budget.
Conclusion
The Danish–Irish comparison illustrates that similar types of exposure to the 
financial crisis can nonetheless lead to very different bank bailouts. In both 
countries, bank representatives and governments worked closely together. 
But only in Denmark did the private sector agree to be part of a collective 
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solution, which ultimately helped to ring-fence the failing banks and use only 
a minimal amount of tax payers’ money. The collective negotiation capacity 
is not a purely Danish phenomenon or characteristic of small open econo-
mies. This is demonstrated through the French example, where the govern-
ment also relied on public–private coordination with the French banking 
sector. Other larger countries did not have a banking industry that was suffi-
ciently homogeneous and interconnected to speak collectively and to be will-
ing to share the burden of a bailout. The government therefore needed to 
impose the conditions in a top down manner, which often implied higher 
costs. In the British case, the government tried to rely on private takeovers in 
the initial period, but was eventually obliged to nationalize several banks, 
which imposed considerable costs due to large write-offs. In countries where 
private institutions participated in the design of the bailout and shared the 
costs, they monitored the evolution and pushed for a disengagement of the 
aid once it was no longer considered necessary. Table 1 summarizes the char-
acteristics of the comparison.
Crony capitalism and bank lobbying have been made responsible for 
many failures of government intervention in times of economic crisis. As we 
have seen, bank influence can indeed introduce important biases and led to 
misjudgment and flawed intervention, with sometimes catastrophic outcomes 
for the taxpayer. However, the most successful bailouts also implied a sub-
stantial participation of the banking industry in finding the most appropriate 
policy solution. In the cases studied, the industry acted in a collective manner 
and the government was thus able to engage them in a way that would allow 
a burden-sharing solution. Bailouts are thus a consequence of the political 
economy of each country, and not just the problem pressure of the financial 
crisis.
Table 1. Country Characteristics.
Ireland Denmark United Kingdom France
Size Small open Small open Big Big
Crisis Considerable 
exposure
Considerable 
exposure
Considerable 
exposure
Moderate 
exposure
Socioeconomic 
order
Liberal Corporatist Liberal Statist
Business–
government
One-on-one 
relationships
Collective One-on-one 
relationships
Collective
Initial 
commitment
High High High Moderate
Outcome Sovereign debt crisis Positive, despite nine 
bank failures
Probably large 
write-offs
Positive
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Notes
 1. Several economists have theoretically derived propositions for the optimal bail-
out strategies (e.g., Aghion, Bolton, & Fries, 1999; Farhi & Tirole, 2009).
 2. Since it is difficult to obtain interviews with the actors most central to the nego-
tiation of bank bailouts—heads of government and their central banks, as well as 
the CEOs of the most important banks—the nature of these interviews is merely 
exploratory and helped to construct the inquiry and the comparison.
 3. Sir Walter Bagehot set out guidelines on a last resort lending that insisted on the 
necessity of good collateral to justify lending to illiquid institutions. Without 
good collateral, ailing institutions should be considered insolvent.
 4. The costs of the Icelandic banking bailout were not available for the comparative 
analysis, but one may simply note that the loans made to the Icelandic govern-
ment in 2008 amounted to US$11,45 billion, which is equal to 65% of Iceland’s 
GDP (US$17.55 billion in 2008).
 5. One may note that countries currently experiencing difficulties such as Greece, 
Italy, or Portugal do not figure either among those having recorded high levels of 
losses. This illustrates that the current sovereign debt crisis is only imperfectly 
related to the banking crisis of 2008.
 6. To be sure, it is difficult to consider take-up rates as a measure of successful or 
unsuccessful government schemes and/or of effective aid granted. In some cases, 
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take-up will be low, because the government plan is inappropriate or highly con-
ditional and thus unattractive for banks, in others, it can reflect the fact that the 
actual health of banks was better than expected or that the program succeeded 
in coordinating bank rescues without public expenditures via private investment. 
Across countries, it appears that the average uptake on capital injections (49%) 
is higher than for debt guarantees (18%), where some countries such as Canada 
or Italy have seen zero participation (Faeh et al., 2009).
 7. The only bank to refuse government participation was Irish Life and Permanent.
 8. The private investors are the pension fund managers Irish Life Investment 
Managers, New Ireland Assurance, and Clients of Allied Irish Banks Investment 
Managers, which are part of Irish Life Permanent, Bank of Ireland, and Allied 
Irish Banks, respectively. Because all three had been under government control 
and guarantee by 2011, the debt of NAMA is considered as government debt 
entirely (European Commission, 2011).
 9. For further information, see www.nama.ie.
10. In a much-quoted editorial comment, the Irish Times said: “There is the shame of 
it all. Having obtained our political independence from Britain to be the masters 
of our own affairs, we have now surrendered our sovereignty to the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.” 
Irish Times, “Was it all for this?” November 18, 2010, p. 17.
11. Det Private Beredskab is also sometimes translated as “Private Reserve Fund.”
12. See www.philip.dk/en/news/bank-bailout-packages-i-and-ii.html.
13. Two of the failing Icelandic banks—Landsbanki and Kaupthing—had U.K.-
based business and a large U.K. depositor base. To protect the assets of U.K. 
depositors, the government issued a freezing order on 8 October 2008, relying 
on antiterrorism rules, which greatly angered the Icelandic government.
14. These institutions were mainly housing and consumer credit institution, often 
the financial activity branches of large industrial groups: PSA Finance (PSA-
Peugeot-Citroën), General Electric, Crédit Immobilier, Laser Cofinoga, RCI 
Banque (Groupe Renault), S2Pass (Groupe Carrefour), and VFS Finance 
(Volvo). GMAC had originally signed the SFEF agreement but did not request 
liquidity support.
15. This amount also included the guarantees granted to Dexia.
16. Similar regrets were expressed by public officials in the French administration. 
Interview, April 15, 2011, Paris.
17. Interview with a representative of the German Bundesbank, Francfort, February 
22, 2011.
References
Aghion, P., Bolton, P., & Fries, S. (1999). Optimal design of bank bailouts: The case 
of transition economies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
155(1), 51-74.
Braun, M., & Raddatz, C. (2009). Banking on politics (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Series No. 4902). Washington, DC: World Bank.
598 Comparative Political Studies 47(4)
Carstensen, M. (2013). Projecting from a fiction: The Case of Denmark and the finan-
cial crisis. New Political Economy.
Cioffi, J. W., & Höpner, M. (2006). The political paradox of finance capitalism: 
Interests, preferences, and center-left party politics in corporate governance 
reform. Politics and Society, 34(4), 463-502.
Clarke, B., & Hardiman, N. (2012). Crisis in the Irish banking system (UCD Geary 
Institute Discussion Paper Series, WP2012/03). Dublin, Ireland: UCD Geary 
Institute.
Coleman, W. D. (1993). Reforming corporatism: The French banking policy com-
munity, 1941-1990. West European Politics, 16(2), 122-143.
Coleman, W. D. (1996). Financial services, globalization and domestic policy 
change. London, England: MacMillan.
Cour des Comptes. (2009). Les concours publics aux établissements de crédit: pre-
miers constats, premières recommandations [Public support to banks: First find-
ings, initial recommendations]. Paris, France: La documentation française.
Cour des Comptes. (2010). Les concours publics aux établissements de crédit: Bilan 
et enseignement à tirer [Public support to banks: Assessment and lessons]. Paris, 
France: La documentation française.
European Commission. (2009). DG Competition’s review of guarantee and recapi-
talisation schemes in the financial sector in the current crisis. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/review_of_schemes_en.pdf
European Commission. (2011). Eurostat supplementary table for the financial crisis: 
Background note. Brussels: Eurostat.
Faeh, T., et al. (2009). An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes (BIS 
Papers, No. 48). Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
Farhi, E, & Tirole, J. (2009). Collective moral hazard, maturity mismatch and sys-
temic bailouts (NBER Working Paper No. w1513). Retrieved from http://www.
nber.org/papers/w15138.pdf
Hall, P. A., & Gingerich, D. W. (2009). Varieties of capitalism and institutional com-
plementarities in the political economy: An empirical analysis. British Journal of 
Political Science, 39(03), 449-482.
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: Institutional foundations of 
comparative advantage. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Honohan, P. (2009). Resolving Ireland’s banking crisis. The Economic and Social 
Review, 40(2), 207-231.
Honohan, P. (2010). The Irish banking crisis: Regulatory and financial stability pol-
icy 2003–2008. Dublin: central bank. Report to the Minister for Finance.
Honohan, P., & Laeven, L. (2005). Systemic financial Crises: Containment and reso-
lution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
House of Commons. (2008). Banking reform (Seventeenth Report of Session 2007-
2008). London, England: Treasury Committee.
Keefer, P. (2002). When do special interest run rampant? Disentangling the role of 
elections, incomplete information and checks and balances in banking crises 
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS2543). Washington, DC: 
 
Grossman and Woll 599
World Bank. Retrieved from http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpa-
per/10.1596/1813-9450-2543
Klingebiel, D., & Laeven, L. (2002). Managing the real and fiscal effects of banking 
crises (World Bank Discussion Paper). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kluth, M., & Lynggaard, K. (2013). Explaining responses in Danish and Irish banking 
to the financial crisis. West European Politics.
Laeven, L., & Valencia, F. (2008). Systemic banking crises: A new database (IMF 
Working Paper, WP/08/224). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Retrieved from www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08224.pdf
Laeven, L., & Valencia,  F. (2010). Resolution of banking crises: The good, the bad, 
and the ugly (IMF Working Paper). Washington, DC: International Monetary 
Fund.
Lane, P. R. (2011). The Irish crisis. Dublin. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794877
Lane, P. R., & Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2007). The external wealth of nations mark 
II: Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970–2004. 
Journal of International Economics, 73(2), 223-250.
Massoc, E., & Nicolas, J. (2012). French capitalism under stress: The politics of 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s bank support plan. Review of International Political Economy. 
19(4), 562-585.
Mayes, D. (2009). Did recent experience of a financial crisis help in coping with the 
current financial turmoil? The case of the Nordic countries. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 47(5), 997-1015.
McCubbins, M. D., & Cox, G. W. (2001). The institutional determinants of economic 
policy outcomes. In S. Haggard & M. McCubbins (Eds.), Presidents and parlia-
ments (pp. 21-63). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Moran, M. (1991). The politics of financial services revolution: The USA, UK and 
Japan. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
Mortensen, J. L., & Seabrooke, L. (2008). Housing as social right or means to wealth 
The politics of property booms in Australia and Denmark. Comparative European 
Politics, 6(3), 305-324.
National Audit Office. (2010). Maintaining the Financial Stability of UK Banks: 
Update on the Support Schemes (Report by the Controller and Auditor General). 
Retrieved from http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/1011676.
pdf
OECD. (2009). OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2009. 2009/19. Paris: OECD 
Publication.
Østrup, F. (2010). The Danish bank crisis in a transnational perspective. In N. Hvidt & 
H. Mouritzen (Eds.), Danish foreign policy yearbook (pp. 75-112). Copenhagen, 
Denmark: DIIS.
Quaglia, L. (2009). The “British Plan” as a pace-setter: The Europeanization of bank-
ing rescue plans in the EU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(5), 1063-
1083.
 
600 Comparative Political Studies 47(4)
Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (2003). Saving capitalism from the capitalists: Unleashing 
the power of financial markets to create wealth and spread opportunity. New 
York, NY: Crown Business.
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. (2009). This time is different: Eight centuries of finan-
cial folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rosas, G. (2009). Curbing bailouts: Bank crises and democratic accountability in 
comparative perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Schmitz, S. W., Weber, B., & Posch, M. (2009). EU bank packages: Objectives and 
potential conflicts of objectives. In  OeNB (Ed.), Financial stability report (pp. 
63-84). Vienna, Austria: OeNB.
Siaroff, A. (1999). Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and 
Measurement. European Journal of Political Research, 36(2), 175-205.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Weber, B., & Schmitz, S. W. (2011). Varieties of helping capitalism: Politico-
economic determinants of bank rescue packages in the EU during the recent cri-
sis. Socio-Economic Review, 9(4), 639-669.
Wiesmann, G. (2011, November). Bank’s €55bn debt error a “misunderstanding.” 
Financial Times. Retrieved from www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c23538f0-056a-11e1-
8eaa-00144feabdc0.html
Zimmer, D., Brandt, W., Buch, C.-M., Hellwig, M., Lotter, H.-H., & Merkt, H. (2011). 
Strategien für den Ausstieg des Bundes aus krisenbedingten Beteiligungen an 
Banken: Gutachten des von der Bundesregierung eingesetzten Expertenrates 
[Exit strategies from crisis-related participation in banks: Report of the expert 
council]. Berlin, Germany: Bundesministerium für Finanzen.
Zysman, J. (1983). Governments, markets, and growth: Financial systems and the 
politics of industrial change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Author Biographies
Emiliano Grossman is associate professor at Sciences Po Paris.
Cornelia Woll is the co-director of the Max Planck Sciences Po Center (MaxPo) and 
the Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire d’Evaluation des Politiques Publiques (LIEPP) at 
Sciences Po Paris.
 
